Article Text
IN THE STATE SUPREME COURT
SYLLABI
Opinions filed by Court: March 23, 1934
28768 28768 Rentschier V. Missouri Paeific R. R. Co. Appeal, Cass. Affirmed. Paine, J. Rose, J., dissenting. 1. "Collective labor agreement" and "trade agreement" are terms used to describe a bargaining agreement, as to wages and conditions of work, entered into by groups of employees, usually organized into a brotherhood or union, on one side, and groups of employers, or corporations, such as railroad companies, on the other side. 2. Such a collective agreement, being a general offer, becomes a binding contract when it is adopted into, and made a part of, the individual contract of each employee. A breach of its terms will give rise to a cause of action by either party. 3. The terms of the collective agreement, as included in an individual labor contract, ought not to be construed narrowly and technically, but broadly, so as to accomplish its evident aims and protect both the employer and the employee. 4. An employee is not deprived of his right to seek redress in the courts because his contract of employment a contained a provision providing method of arbitration of disputes. sented to and allowed by the county board.
28890 28890 State ex rel Sorensen v. Denton State Bank (The Loan & Finance Co., Intervener). Appeal, Lancaster. Affirmed. Day, 1. Successful bidder at judicial sale becomes a party, may appear and urge confirmation, or show cause why he should be released from his obligation, and may appeal from the order upon motion for confirmation. 2. It is the duty of bank receivers and trial courts to attempt to secure highest possible price for assets of failed bank. 3. Substantially increased offers to receiver for assets of failed bank before confirmation of sale to highest bidder at public sale is sufficient evidence to support a finding of trial court in exercise of its judicial discretion that confirmation should be denied and new sale ordered.
28894 28894 State ex rel Sorensen V. Farmers State Bank, Wood River, (School Dist. No. 8, Intervener). Appeal, Hall. Affirmed. Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed on the authority of State V. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Deshler, 3 SCJ, No 23, P 8.
28790 28790 In re Estate of Crosty, Crosby V. Johnson. Appeal, Douglas. Affirmed. Begley, District Judge. 1. Where an application is made to probate carbon copy of a purported last will and testament which has not been found, and on the trial a witness is produced who testified, without contradiction or impeachment, that the deceased during his lifetime destroyed said last will and testament in his presence, with intention of revoking it, the verdict of the jury that said deceased left no last will and testament at the time of his death will be affirmed. 2. It is not prejudicial error in a will contest to ask a mental expert, who had previously testified as to the effects of chronic alcoholism upon the mind of a patient, if in his opinion such patient was in sufficient mental condition to understand reasonably business affairs, and those to whom he was naturally obligated, or to know and understand about his property and his obligations reasonably toward those having lawful claims upon him, in case he should die and his property would have to be disposed of.
28808 28808 McRae V. Mercury Ins. Co. Appeal, Douglas. Affirmed. Goss, C.J.
1. An agreement for the immediate cancelation of a fire insurance policy, without giving five days' notice, can be made, and this can be shown by acts and conduct as well as by direct words. 2. Acquiescence in a cancelation notice will operate to cancel a fire insurance policy and will work an entoppel to assert that the policy is still in force.
28881 28881 Dworak V. Shire. Appeal, Lancaster. Affirmed. Goss, C.J. 1. In law action, where the evidence is in substantial conflict, the decision of fact is for the jury. 2. A judgment on a verdict will not be set aside when the evidence of the prevailing party sustains the verdict. 3. Evidence and instructions examined and HELD to be free from prejudicial error.
28889 28889 The County of Knox V. Cook. Appeal, Knox. Affirmed in part and in part reversed and remanded. Good, J. 1. A county judge is liable on his official bond for trust funds coming into his hands by virtue of his office, which funds he has lost by reason of insolvency of bank in which he had deposited them, notwithstanding he may have acted in good faith and without negligence in the selection of a depository. 2. County judge cannot set off against a claim for unreported fees the amount which he has paid as premium for his official bond, where no claim for such premium has been pre-
28895 28895 Toews V. Schlitt. Appeal, Adams. Affirmed. Paine, J. Evidence examined, and judgment of the trial court affirmed.
28897 28897 State ex rel Sorensen V. Commercial State Bank, Crawford. (Thomas, Intervener.) Appeal, Dawes. Reversed and remanded. Day, J. 1. Where S. deposits money in bank for which certificate of deposit issues, relationship of debtor and creditor is ordinarily created between bank and depositor. 2. This relationship is not changed to that of trustee and CESTUI QUE TRUST. because administrator of S. does not know of deposit and does not find certificate of deposit until informed years later by receiver of bank after its insolvency, even though bank, with knowledge of death of S. and administration of her estate, did not make voluntary disclosure that S. some years prior to her death had certificate which was non negotiable, but was assignable. 3. Wrongful conversion of fund by bank and augmentation of its assets essential elements to create trust fund. are not established by evidence in this case.
28899 28899 State ex rel Sorensen V. Commercial State Bank, Crawford (School District of The City of Crawford). Appeal, Dawes. Affirmed. Eberly, J. 1. The application for a new trial, by motion, because of newly discovered evidence, material for the party applying, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, is required by section 20-1143, Comp. St. 1929, to be made at the term the verdict, report or decision was rendered. 2. After adjournment SINE DIE of the term at which the judgment was rendered, the provisions of section 20-1145, Comp. St. 1929, are controlling as to statutory application for a new trial. 3. A motion for a new trial cannot be amended by assigning new grounds after the statutory time for fil ng such motion has expired, except upon a finding by the court that the party was unavoidably prevented from presenting the matter contained in the amendment. 4. Even the action of a majority of a school district board will not bind the district. without notice to or participation therein of the other members. 5. Estoppel not having been pleaded in the district court may not be urged on appeal as reason for reversal.