Missouri Lincoln Trust Company (St Louis, MO)

Episode Information

Episode UID
8298895791293
Episode Type
Suspension โ†’ Closure
Bank Type
trust
Bank ID
829889579 hash
Start Date
September 1, 1907*
Location
St Louis, Missouri (38.627, -90.198)

Metadata

Model
gpt-5-mini (chosen from majority vote of a three-model LLM ensemble)
Short Digest
46ddbf40e9489510

Response Measures

None

Description

Sources indicate the company was closed/suspended before Oct 1907 and later subject to receivership litigation.

Events (4)

1. September 1, 1907* Suspension
Cause
Bank Specific Adverse Info
Cause Details
Institution was in a deteriorated condition and was forced to close before the October 1907 panic
Newspaper Excerpt
When the Missouri-Lincoln Trust company was closed, prior to the panic of October, 1907
Source
newspapers
2. March 1, 1908 Receivership
Newspaper Excerpt
filed suit today against the Missouri-Lincoln Trust company ... asking for a receiver for the property formerly held by the American Lead and Baryta company
Source
newspapers
3. June 9, 1910 Receivership
Newspaper Excerpt
Three stockholders have filed suit in the circuit court asking for the appointment of a receiver for the Missouri Lincoln Trust company
Source
newspapers
4. February 5, 1911 Other
Newspaper Excerpt
St. Louis kept aloof until they had to hand over $1,500,000, and agree to advance $1,000,000 more in connection with the Missouri Lincoln Trust Company suspension.
Source
newspapers

Newspaper Articles (5)

Article from The Cairo Bulletin, March 1, 1908

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Article Text

SUIT AGAINST ST. LOUIS BANK MAN WANTS MISSOURI-LINCOLN TRUST COMPANY ENJOINED FROM SELLING LAND IN WHICH HE IS INTERESTED. St. Louis, Feb. 29.-Jos. C. Donnelly of Detroit, filed suit today against the Missouri-Lincoln Trust company and the Mercantile Trust company, asking for a receiver for the property formerly held by the American Lead and Baryta company, in Washington county, embracing thirty-three acres of land. Donnelly savs he bought thirty thousand dollars worth of the company's stock and states in his petition that under judgment for $41,255 given him in the circut court, he is given joint lien with the Missouri-LIncoln Trust company. Hs alleges that the claim of the latter company is about to be given precedence and asks that it be restrained from disposing of the land. The American Lead and Baryta company is capitalized at $1,500,000.


Article from Iowa County Democrat, March 5, 1908

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Article Text

ASKS RECEIVER FOR TWO TRUST COMPANIES Sa. Louis, March 1.-Joseph C. Donnelly of Detroit filed suit Saturday against the Missouri-Lincoln Trust company and the Mercantile Trust company, asking for a receiver for property formerly held by the American Lead and Bayta company in Washington county, embracing 33,000 acres fo land. Donnelly says he bought $30,000 worth of the company's stock and states in his petition that under a judgment for $41,255 given him in the circuit court, he is given a joint lien with Missouri-Lincoln Trust company. He alleges that the claim of the latter company is about to be given precedence and asks that it be restrained from disposing of the land The American Lead and Baryta company is capitalized at $1,500,000.


Article from Omaha Daily Bee, November 20, 1909

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Article Text

sociation. The Chicago innovation appealed to financiers. When the Missouri-Lincoln Trust company was closed, prior to the panic of October, 1907, the St. Louis banks arranged for clearing house investigation. The St. Louis clearing house maintains a complete bureau of examination. The annex is in charge of trained examiners, formerly in the government and state service. The examiners investigate the assets, records and affairs of all banks and trust companies in the entire St. Louis district affillated with the St. Louis clearing house. Case of Missouri-Lincoln Trust. The Missouri-Lincoln Trust company would not have been forced into liquidation if the clearing house had created the examination bureau two years earlier. The bank would have been saved. After the institution was in a deteriorated condition, the only means of guaranteeing depositors against loss was for the clearing house to assume the liability, and this was done. Had the clearing house bureau been organized in ample time, there would have been no occasion for a guaranty. Loss would have been prevented. The St. Louis and Chicago Clearing House association operate on the principle that losses should be obviated. Their object is to prohibit improper banking and thereby remove or reduce the chance of hazard. The deposit guaranty law does not succeed in preventing losses, but aims at protecting depositors, and the result is that it encourages injudicious banking and tends to impair the capital and surplus of financial institutions. A. M. Young, state bank commissioner of Oklahoma, said he did not underestimate the precautionary importance and force of clearing house supervision. In fact, he expressed decided approbation, intimating that the clearing house could produce more good than the federal or state governments. He thought clearing house supervision would be highly desirable in the cities of Oklahoma, but he believed the guaranty law would be necessary for country banks.


Article from El Paso Herald, June 9, 1910

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Article Text

St. Louis, Mo., June 9.-Three stockholders have filed suit in the circuit court asking for the appointment of a receiver for the Missouri Lincoln Trust company and for an accounting.


Article from The Washington Times, February 5, 1911

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Article Text

the country lost $191,566,488 between the 10th of November, 1910, and the 7th of January, 1911, the dates upon which comparisons are based, as shown by the responses to the calls of the Comp- troller of the Currency. There are a number of contributing causes that make for just such condi- tions.. In the city of New York alone, where $158,000,000 loss occurred in the deposits, the hundreds of corporations pay out about $225,000,000 in interest and dividend accounts on January 1 of each year, the amount varying but the fig- ures representing the approximate dis- tribution at the beginning of 1911. Checks go out on the evening of De- cember 31. January 1 was a holiday, also January 2. Many of these checks were mailed to out-of-town investors, although New York investors received the greater part. There was much uncertainty in the market for securities at that time and it is but natural to suppose that much of this money was placed in savings banks and trust companies that it might earn a little interest pending reinvestment. The natural shifting of funds between trust companies, savings banks, and national banks is such an important factor that no actual com- parisons could be made without the showing of all three classes of fiscal institutions. Deposits were larger during the pre- holiday activity of November than in the after-the-holiday dullness of Jan- uary-the always quiet month, the dull- est save midsummer. It may seem rather strange, but it is a fact that when business is decidedly lively the apparent deposits in banks are larger than in dull times. There is a lively interchange of checks in periods of trade activity, and checks almost in- variably count in deposits as double. A check for $50,000 paid by this corporation to that contractor is deposited in the latter's bank. He is given credit for the deposit, but the money standing back of that check, the money that honors it, is over in the other bank un- til the next day at clearings-that is, as a rule. The only way in which such doubling would not show would be on balances between banks. On Friday of last week the clearings of the banks of New York were $476,784,000, balances $29 759,532; of Baltimore, $6,519,- 000; balances, $803,999; Philadelphia, $32,- 049,000; Chicago, $53,000,000, and Boston, $28,000,000. It is easy to see how a drop in the daily clearings through a let-up in trade would cause an apparent loss in individual deposits. Another reason is readily found in the fact that much of the reinvestment in the first few days of January of this year was in the bond market, and many drew their funds from banks for the purpose of participating in bond pur- chases. Then deposits would shrink, and the underwriter of the bonds, having made a sale, would, certainly in many instances, pay off the loans to the bank, thereby increasing the cash in banks but not in the deposits, and the state- ment showed a gain in cash of $20,000,000 and a reduction in loans of $48,000,000. But there was yet another reason that contributed to this "mystery." The passing of the Robin banks and the smash of the Carnie Trust Company brought some uneasiness and withdraw- al of deposits both on account of timid individuals and some who were not timid. The sales of stocks on the New York Exchange in January, 1911, were 9,884,169 shares; in January, 1910, 24,116,544 shares. The bond offerings, new issues, in January, 1911, totaled $141,400,000; short- term notes, $36,000 and the stocks $55,- 000,000, a total of $232,000,000. January, 1911, the bond sales increased 70 per cent over the December, 1910, sales. Cause enough for a loss of deposits. ### Since January 7 Over $100,000,000 Has Been Added to Individual Deposits in New York Banks Two of the larger industrial corpora- tions have established offices in New York city, where their obligations are listed for the benefit of anyone interest- ed. In this way commercial paper brok- ers will be able to tell just what the aggregate of the corporated borrowings are, and whether paper in their posses- sion is genuine or not. The listing will also give date of paper, length of time to run from making, and all other infor- mation necessary. This is a step in the right direction- the direction of financial publicity, and in the line of policy desired by Comp- troller Murray. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, Pitts- burg, St. Leuis, Philadelphia, and some other cities have a most rigid inspection of bank conditions. The banks conduct their own examinations and the super- vision is much more elaborate and more frequent than State or national bank examinations. Chicago did not take the bull by the horns until it was obliged to put up $7,000,000 to save disaster when the Walsh banks went down. St. Louis kept aloof until they had to hand over $1,500,000, and agree to ad- vance $1,000,000 more in connection with the Missouri Lincoln Trust Company suspension. All of the fifty-eight banks and trust companies doing business in Chicago are under clearing house supervision. With a high-grade $25,000 a year examiner and seven assistants, the clearing house has determined to prevent wildcat financing. The report of the head examiner shows cash on hand; past due paper, bad debts, loans to bank directors, loans to corporations in which bank directors are interested, and the character of assets representing the bank's surplus, capi- tal, and undivided profits. A copy of this report is handed to the president of the bank and each director is notified that the report awaits his in- spection. Another copy is filed under seal in the clearing house, but is not opened unless something wrong devel- ops in the bank thus carefully searched. No director can claim ignorance as an excuse. If rottenness develops, rehabili- tation follow quickly or a closure before further loss is sustained. In St. Louis the examiners, before as- suming duties, are compelled to agree not to take office with any bank or trust company within 300 miles of St. Louis for three years after leaving the service. Thus the secrets of the exami- nations are guarded.